Prompt-injection defenses often ask a model to decide whether another model should act—while that decision-maker may have already read the attacker’s instructions. SPILLWAY instead makes the destination check deterministic: targets must be grounded in the user’s request, trusted typed tool returns, or fixed delegation rules. This separates where an action goes from what untrusted text says.
Key Findings
- The admission floor uses identity-bearing fields such as email addresses and account identifiers, not arbitrary text in a tool result. That makes the core target decision a set lookup rather than another model judgment.
- A rule-based sanitizer removes selected instruction-like regions before they reach the agent, while retaining the removed spans as evidence. An optional local judge can restore some refused calls, but not calls targeting values inside those spans.
- In the reported evaluations, standard templated injections did not redirect actions to attacker-controlled targets across three backbones; mean in-scope attack success with a released reinforcement-learning attacker was 0.005. The defense required no trigger-driven backbone reruns and almost no additional model calls.
Who It’s For—and the Trade-off
A good fit for teams building agents that act on email, files, calendars, or payments and want an auditable baseline for controlling destinations. It is not a complete defense against harmful content sent to a legitimate recipient, and its guarantees depend on correctly identifying target fields and trusted typed returns. New tool ecosystems need their roles declared, and targets that never appear in tool output fall outside the stated guarantee.